‘Keeps were a way of isolating guerillas from the masses’

WE conclude our interview with Cde Kenneth Sibanda pseudonym Cde Lee Madiro or Mountain, a former freedom fighter who operated in Mashonaland Central Province during the armed struggle. As he rounds up his narration, Cde Sibanda tells our Assistant Editor Mkhululi Sibanda (MS) about the operations he was involved in. Below are excerpts from the interview. Read on . . .

MS: When we ended our conversation last time you were talking about moving to the crossing point along the Zambezi River. Let us resume from there.

Cde Sibanda: The detachment was taken to a base called Nkume, which was situated on the west of Feira.

It was at night and we found some experienced guerillas who took us to the crossing point. Their duties involved monitoring the area and facilitating the movement of our units to the operational areas in the then Rhodesia. They were in charge of the dinghies, in other words, they were our navy unit. They were also tasked with checking on the movement of the Rhodesian soldiers so that the guerillas who were being deployed did not fall into the hands of the enemy. On that day we started crossing at 10pm and that went on until 1am. We were crossing in batches.

MS: So after being moved across the Zambezi River, what was the next step?

Cde Sibanda: We would take positions, while waiting for others to cross as well. We will avoid grouping in one position in case the enemy located us. Being in one position meant being easily slaughtered by the enemy.

MS: What was the feeling like when crossing the Zambezi River?

Cde Sibanda: You know, with us as ZPRA, we regarded the Zambezi River as our first enemy. Being infested with animals such as crocodiles and hippos meant danger. There were incidents where some comrades were lost when the dinghies capsised after being attacked by the hippos. As for crocodiles, they were better as they were not aggressive in fast-flowing water but hippos, if they felt provoked, could do anything. However, as for us, our crossing was incident-free. After ensuring everybody had crossed the navy comrades would return to keep their positions waiting for the deployment of other units.

MS: When did you start moving inland?

Cde Sibanda: We started moving immediately to avoid the Rhodesians’ OPs (Observation Points). We were taking advantage of the cover of darkness. The Rhodesians would deploy their troops in high-lying areas to check on the movement of guerillas. If they sighted the guerillas they would call their Airforce, which would deploy their military aircrafts. That would spell trouble for the guerillas who would be trying to negotiate the Zambezi Escarpment, a rough terrain. As a result of that we would avoid moving during the day, lie low and resume the journey at night. It took us about two weeks to reach our area of operation.

MS: Which targets were you given to hit?

Cde Sibanda: The orders, when we left Zambia were that we should immediately locate and hit Angwa Bridge and Mushumbi Garrison, which was being used by the Rhodesian forces as a stage to counter guerillas who were being deployed from Zambia. As for the Angwa Bridge the reason for hitting it was to cut off supplies of the Rhodesian Army. As narrated by Cde Fomoja in the recent interview with you, we hit Mushumbi Garrison and caused a lot of damage there.

MS: What about Angwa Bridge?

Cde Sibanda: A selected unit was sent to destroy it but it was not as successful as we had anticipated. The damage was very minimal because of the material used. We did not have enough explosives to cause maximum damage on the bridge.

MS: Some troops from your detachment started working with ZANLA after the attack on Mushumbi Garrison. As the deputy detachment commander take us through what happened.

Cde Sibanda: Yes, we held talks with ZANLA commanders on the ground. However, that was done by the senior commanders like Jonasi Donga (Wilson Dube), now late Colonel Dan Dutsa, and our detachment commander Climb Mataure, not Clive as previously written. He was called Climb. They agreed to start with a pilot project of combining the platoon that was commanded by Fomoja (Lt-Col Nimrod Ndlovu) and that of the ZANLA platoon commander, Cde Norman. In fact ZANLA forces were coming from Dande where they were operating from.

MS: What about you and the two platoons?

Cde Sibanda: We remained as we were, but it was agreed that we work closely with ZANLA. The difference was that we did not operate as a single unit like what Fomoja and Norman did. We would meet with ZANLA and share notes. So when Fomoja and Norman left the area around Mushumbi we remained there, continuing with the operations.

MS: How did the Rhodesian Army react to the attack on Mushumbi?

Cde Sibanda: In fact after hitting Angwa Bridge, the Rhodesians tried to pursue us. We sold them a dummy by pretending as if we were heading back to Zambia while we hid in an area located between Angwa and Hunyani rivers. The area had big trees which made it very difficult for the Rhodesians to deploy their infantry. So after our attack on Mushumbi Garrison, we remained at Chitsungo, I was with the two platoons commanded by Twoboy and Bhebhe.

MS: What remained of Mushumbi Garrison?

Cde Sibanda: The Rhodesian forces later on regrouped and started looking for us. After that battle we were immediately joined by another detachment from Zambia under the command of Cde King. In a bid to control the situation we had numerous contacts with the Rhodesian forces and it was during one of those when Cde King was killed together with three other comrades. As for the Mushumbi Garrison, the Rhodesians force-marched villagers to live there. They turned it into a protected village commonly known during the war as amaKeep. It was a Rhodesian tactic of isolating the guerillas from the masses and to some point it worked as we relied on the masses for food and other provisions.

MS: Faced with such a situation what did you do?

Cde Sibanda: We left a few sections with the main body moving to other areas. Besides the detachment that was commanded by King, there was another one that arrived and that was stretching the resources of the masses. At that point, ZPRA was deploying large units. The war was also intensifying and I remember a Rhodesian unit, which could have been the Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR) coming from Llewellyn Barracks, just outside Bulawayo. They told the villagers to pass the message to us that we should hold our fire. They said we had turned the area into a shooting range.

MS: Then came the ceasefire period, tell us about it.

Cde Sibanda: We moved into Papa Assembly Point. When we started facing water problems at Papa we relocated to Mashumbi. Then in March 1981, I was one of those who were sent to the Zimbabwe Military Academy in Gweru where I came out as a full Lieutenant. I was then deployed to 4:6 Battalion, which was based at Silobela. Our battalion commander was Lt-Col Shoriwa. Lt-Col Shoriwa was then involved in an accident, resulting in him being taken to Tsanga Lodge, a convalescent centre in Nyanga, Manicaland Province. He was replaced by Lt-Col Bernard Dungeni. Nearby there was also 4:5 battalion under the command of now late national hero, Brigadier-General (Rtd) Collin Moyo, uRodwell Nyika and 4:7 battalion commanded by Lt-Col Kajesi. The battalions were later disbanded and I was sent to Headquarters Midlands District in Gweru before being sent to Guinea Fowl, which was the HQ for the Fifth Brigade. I was to be transferred to 3:8 battalion in Murewa before being deployed to Mozambique for operations. I retired from the army in 1992 soon after the Mozambican Campaign and by that time I was based at 1:3 in Guyu, Gwanda District.