Online Reporter
Evans Mushawevato-Herald Correspondent
LOOKING at the final stages of the liberation struggle, it is clear that the white minority regime under Ian Smith had already lost the war well before the Lancaster House Conference of 1979.
The formalities of diplomacy in London were merely a final admission of defeat — a way for the Rhodesians to bow out with some semblance of dignity.
The truth, however, lies in the battlefield, in the smoke-filled skies over Manicaland, in the blackened rubble of Rhodesia’s fuel infrastructure, and in the relentless guerrilla operations that dismantled their military strategy piece by piece.
The Rhodesian war machine was defeated by a relentless guerrilla force. It was undone by a strategic failure to adapt, a fatal over-reliance on conventional warfare tactics, and the inexorable spread of guerrilla operations that rendered Rhodesia’s defence lines overstretched, vulnerable and ultimately unsustainable.
From the outset, the Rhodesians were fighting an asymmetric war they were ill-prepared to win. The ZANLA and ZIPRA forces, backed by friendly countries such as Mozambique and Zambia, Tanzania, China and Russia understood that the war was one of attrition — bleeding the Rhodesians over time, forcing them to spend resources they could not replenish and breaking their will to fight.
Ian Smith and his generals, particularly General Peter Walls, attempted to use overwhelming firepower and a reliance on forward airfields to suppress the guerrilla fighters. This strategy, however, was fundamentally flawed.
Unlike conventional forces, ZANLA guerrillas could melt into the bush after striking, rendering the Rhodesian army’s superior technology and firepower ineffective. The Rhodesians’ reliance on helicopters, jets and armoured vehicles made them strong in concentrated attacks but weak in prolonged engagements.
Their logistical lifeline — fuel, airfields, and infrastructure — was too fragile to sustain a drawn-out war. The guerrillas knew this and focused their efforts on undermining these critical points, targeting Rhodesia’s economy and supply chains rather than engaging the enemy head-on.
By 1977, it was evident that Rhodesia was haemorrhaging. ZANLA had escalated its operations, launching strikes deeper into Rhodesian territory, disrupting economic and military targets that the regime had assumed were untouchable.
The BP Fuel Tanks Attack
The attack on the BP fuel tanks was one of the most decisive blows in the war. Rhodesia’s entire war effort hinged on its ability to move troops and supply its forward operations. With sanctions already crippling fuel supplies, the destruction of the BP tanks was a masterstroke.
ZANLA understood that fuel was the Achilles’ heel of Rhodesia’s mechanised military. The Rhodesians had built their strategy around fast-moving air assaults, requiring vast amounts of fuel for helicopters, jets and transport vehicles.
When ZANLA guerrillas struck the fuel depots, they sent shockwaves through Rhodesia’s economy and military apparatus. Without fuel, Rhodesia’s capacity to project power was severely diminished. Aircraft sat grounded, troop movements slowed, and morale within the army plummeted.
The war effort, already overstretched, began to stall. The attack severely crippled the country. Half a million barrels of petroleum product, which translated to 40 percent of Rhodesia’s fuel supplies, was destroyed.
The Grand Reef Air Base Attack
The Grand Reef Air Base near Odzi was another critical target. As one of Rhodesia’s Forward Airfields (FAF), it served as a launchpad for ground and air operations into Mozambique and for counter-insurgency missions deep within Rhodesia itself.
Rhodesian generals saw these FAFs as their lifeline, enabling them to coordinate attacks and maintain their operational reach. When ZANLA attacked Grand Reef, they struck at the heart of Rhodesia’s strategic infrastructure.
The destruction of aircraft, fuel reserves and ammunition depots crippled Rhodesia’s ability to project air power — one of their few remaining advantages. Grand Reef was supposed to be impenetrable, heavily fortified and defended.
Its loss was not just physical but psychological, shaking the confidence of Rhodesian forces and proving that ZANLA could strike wherever it chose. The attack on Grand Reef exemplified the guerrilla strategy at its finest — attacking key nodes of Rhodesia’s military infrastructure to weaken their ability to fight.
The Mavonde Battle: The Final Blow
If Grand Reef and the BP fuel tanks attacks were tactical victories, the Mavonde Battle in 1979 was a strategic catastrophe for Rhodesia. General Peter Walls and his forces attempted to deliver a decisive blow to ZANLA at their headquarters near the Mozambique border, hoping to strengthen their hand at the Lancaster House Conference. This was a classic Rhodesian mistake — overestimating their military might and underestimating the ingenuity and resolve of ZANLA forces.
Under the command of Cde Rex Nhongo (Solomon Mujuru), ZANLA had prepared thoroughly. General Josiah Tongogara had warned of the attack, and defences were made impregnable. The Rhodesians launched an all-out assault — ground troops, armoured vehicles, and air support — but they were met with fierce resistance.
ZANLA’s preparations, discipline and tactical use of terrain nullified the Rhodesians’ advantages. Rhodesian jets were shot down, ground forces were repelled and losses mounted. What was supposed to be a knockout blow turned into a humiliation.
The significance of Mavonde cannot be overstated. For the Rhodesians, it confirmed their worst fears — they could not defeat ZANLA on the battlefield. Every conventional tactic they had relied upon had been rendered ineffective.
The Rhodesian army was demoralised, their resources exhausted and their confidence shattered. After Mavonde, the writing was on the wall. Rhodesia had no military path to victory. The Rhodesian regime was overstretched and unable to adapt.
By 1978, the Rhodies had opened multiple operational areas across the country — Central Rhodesia (Grapple), the Salisbury Area (Salops) and Lake Kariba (Splinter). This expansion forced Rhodesian forces to spread their troops thin across vast territories, further diluting their effectiveness.
The Rhodesian military relied heavily on small, elite units such as the Selous Scouts and the Rhodesian Light Infantry, but these forces were too small to exert control over the growing operational areas.
The guerrilla war had shifted into urban zones, rural areas and across international borders. Rhodesian troops were constantly reacting to attacks, never able to seize the initiative.
The Psychological Defeat
War is as much about psychology as it is about fire power, and here too, the Rhodesians lost. ZANLA’s ability to strike critical infrastructure, attack forward air bases, and repel assaults like Mavonde eroded the morale of the Rhodesian forces.
Soldiers began to lose faith in their commanders, questioning whether victory was even possible. Meanwhile, the guerrillas grew bolder. Each successful operation inspired confi – dence in the rank and file of ZANLA, while Rhodesian soldiers grew increasingly demoralised.
Ian Smith’s proclamations that Rhodesia would ‘never surrender’ began to ring hollow. The Rhodesian populace, too, began to feel the strain. The economic collapse, combined with constant guerrilla attacks, turned Rhodesia into a nation living under siege.
Lancaster House: A Forced Surrender
By the time Rhodesian leaders arrived at the Lancaster House Conference in late 1979, the war had already been lost. ZANLA and ZIPRA forces had dismantled Rhodesia’s military and economic infrastructure. Their supply chains were broken, their forces exhausted, and their morale shattered.
The Lancaster House Conference was not about negotiations — it was a surrender. The Rhodesians had run out of options. They could either agree to the terms of independence or face the inevitable: ZANLA would march into Salisbury with their guns blazing, and there would be no Rhodesia left to negotiate for.
Why Rhodesia Could Never Win
From a military strategist’s perspective or any other, Rhodesia’s defeat was inevitable. The combination of a poorly adaptable conventional military strategy, overstretched resources, economic collapse and the relentless spread of guerrilla warfare ensured that the Rhodesian regime stood no chance.
The attacks on infrastructure — BP fuel tanks, Grand Reef Air Base — coupled with major battles like Mavonde, exposed Rhodesia’s weaknesses and hastened its collapse. ZANLA’s strategy of attrition, mobility and psychological warfare overwhelmed the Rhodesians, proving that no amount of fi repower could defeat a determined guerrilla force fighting for justice and liberation.
In the end, the Rhodesians were not defeated at Lancaster House; they were defeated in the bush, in the flames of their burning fuel tanks, and in the smouldering wreckage of their airfields.
By the time the diplomats signed the agreement, the war had already been won. Zimbabwe’s independence was not a gift of negotiations. It was the hard-won result of a brilliantly executed guerrilla strategy that left the Rhodesian regime exposed. –The Patriot
leeroy mupariri
