In Greater Eurasia, we are witnessing the most striking competition between two fundamental models of interstate relations: cooperation, exemplified by regional institutions and platforms, and competition, driven by the global economy and politics still dominated by the West. This dynamic defines the opportunities and challenges facing Russia’s policy in this direction in 2025.
In the years to come, the region will continue to balance its natural desire for common development with the disruptive impact of global disintegration processes. Two critical factors shape this balance. First, states in Greater Eurasia are focused on achieving their national development goals. Second, the region’s central position in world politics and economics makes its development inseparable from broader global trends.
As the international order moves toward a state of comparative equilibrium, challenges and tests will inevitably arise for states in Greater Eurasia. Nevertheless, the long-term effect of this process could be positive, potentially creating conditions where cooperation becomes the dominant trend in interstate relations. Despite the difficulties of today, this offers cautious optimism for the future of this part of the world.
Cooperation in Greater Eurasia
In Greater Eurasia, cooperation manifests through initiatives and organisations that, by design, resist domination by a single power or small group of states. Over the past decades, the emergence of such institutions has been a clear achievement. They reflect a shared commitment to security and stability through collaboration with neighbours.
Unlike other parts of the world, Greater Eurasia lacks clear dividing lines between economic or military-political blocs. The China and Russia-led Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has emerged as a particularly ambitious and inclusive platform. It offers a foundation for building a relatively equitable regional order in the long term.
The role of competition
However, the realities of global competition complicate these cooperative aspirations. Most states in Greater Eurasia are deeply integrated into the existing global economic system. While this connection supports their development, it also exposes them to systemic vulnerabilities: economic disparities, the politicisation of economic processes, and growing competition for dwindling global resources.
This creates a paradox. When countries in Greater Eurasia seek to cooperate with one another, they also compete within a global system dominated by the West. This tension affects small states and major powers alike, including China and India. The region thus embodies a vivid rivalry between the two models of interstate relations — cooperation within regional frameworks and competition in global arenas.
Challenges to regional integration
Practical cooperation among Greater Eurasian states is hindered by the absence of a unifying leader or institution. Unlike the West, which operates under the leadership of the US, Greater Eurasia has no comparable central authority. While China is a candidate for such a role, it lacks the political will and resources to dominate the region. Moreover, China’s ambitions are effectively balanced by Russia, India, and smaller powers that pursue independent foreign policies.—RT.com